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SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING:  REMOVING PARENS
PATRIAE SUITS UNDER THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT
Alexander Lemann*
This Note examines the applicability of the Class Action Fairness Act’s
(CAFA) removal provisions to parens patriae suits.  CAFA expanded federal
diversity jurisdiction to include class actions with minimal diversity, doing
away with a rule that had kept most class actions in state court.  Although
CAFA does not mention parens patriae suits, their inherent similarity to
class actions raised the question of whether they too could now be removed to
federal court.  The Fifth Circuit, in Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate
Insurance Co., has held that the real parties in interest—those whose inju-
ries form the basis of parens patriae standing—may be treated as a class of
individuals for purposes of removal under CAFA.  This Note examines the
language and goals of CAFA as well as the concept of parens patriae stand-
ing and argues that the Fifth Circuit’s approach should be abandoned.  Al-
lowing removal of parens patriae suits under CAFA works against the Act’s
goals, is not supported by its language, and violates principles of federalism
enshrined in the Eleventh Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)1 was the culmination
of years of congressional effort to address widespread abuses in class ac-
tion litigation.2  Before the passage of CAFA, the requirements of federal
diversity jurisdiction kept even the largest class actions out of federal
court,3 while the number of plaintiffs involved allowed attorneys to file
suit in virtually any jurisdiction in the country.  One result was the emer-
gence of a handful of magnet jurisdictions that attracted disproportion-
ate numbers of large class action filings, thanks to real or perceived sym-
pathies towards plaintiffs on the part of local judges and juries.4  This
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Columbia Law School.
1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context:  A Preliminary View, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1441 (2008) (noting “years of
intense lobbying . . . partisan wrangling . . . filibusters, [and] fragile compromises”).
3. Federal jurisdiction required complete diversity, which was only present if all
named plaintiffs were diverse from all defendants.  Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1921).
4. John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case out of
It . . . in State Court, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 143, 160–64 (2001); Victor E. Schwartz,
Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions:  A
Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 483, 499
(2000) (“[O]ver a recent two-year period, a state court in rural Alabama certified almost as
many class actions (thirty-five cases) as all 900 federal districts did in a year (thirty-eight
cases).”).  Madison County, Illinois, is another notorious example.  S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
13 (2005); Beisner & Miller, supra, at 162.
121
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situation was troubling not just because of misconduct on the part of state
courts, but conceptually as well; the enormous power of state courts over-
seeing class actions of national scope offended traditional notions of fed-
eralism and was seen as unfair to defendants.5  Congress’s solution to
these problems was to expand the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction
over class actions and to allow defendants to remove cases to federal
court more easily.6
CAFA contained a stinging rebuke of the use of class action litigation
brought by private parties to serve the public good (“private attorneys
general”),7 but it did not explicitly mention suits brought by actual attor-
neys general.  The doctrine of parens patriae gives a state standing to sue
on behalf of its citizens.  Although it derives from the “royal prerogative”
granted to the King of England to sue on behalf of “helpless” subjects like
children and the mentally incompetent, parens patriae has been ex-
panded in the twentieth century by a series of Supreme Court decisions,
and has been an increasingly popular vehicle for state attorneys general
to vindicate the rights of their constituents.8
Because parens patriae suits necessarily involve the rights of a large
number of people, they bear some resemblance to class actions, even if
the only plaintiff is the state.9  This analogy did not escape the notice of
Congress, which debated and eventually dropped an amendment ex-
empting parens patriae suits from the scope of CAFA.  In the first few
cases dealing with the issue, federal courts universally treated parens pa-
triae suits as not removable under CAFA. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v.
Allstate Insurance Co.10 was the first case to hold otherwise.  Affirming the
district court’s grant of removal, the Fifth Circuit held that the presence
of only one plaintiff on the pleadings did not end its inquiry.  Instead, it
reasoned, courts should “pierce the pleadings” to determine the “real
parties in interest.”11  If those parties were a class of people, the court
could apply CAFA’s grant of diversity jurisdiction and allow removal.12
This Note argues that CAFA should not be applied to states’ parens
patriae actions.  Part I provides an overview of CAFA’s expansion of diver-
5. Congress expressed its displeasure at this situation by declaring that the stringent
interpretation of diversity jurisdiction was “keeping cases of national importance out of
Federal court,” § 2(a)(4)(A), 119 Stat. at 5, and by noting that one purpose of CAFA was to
“restore the intent of the framers,” § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. at 5.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
7. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 59 (“[T]he concept of class actions serving a ‘private
attorney general’ or other enforcement purpose is illegal.”).
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. Like class actions, parens patriae suits are representative and involve injuries to a
large group of people who would not likely sue individually.  See infra notes 92–95 and R
accompanying text.
10. 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
11. Id. at 424–25.
12. See id. at 430 (“Having determined that the policyholders are the real parties in
interest, we agree that this action was properly removed pursuant to CAFA because the
requirements of a ‘mass action’ are easily met . . . .”).
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sity jurisdiction and the motivations behind it, as well as a brief history of
parens patriae standing.  Part II explores the question of whether CAFA
applies to parens patriae suits and the approaches to this issue taken by
federal courts.  Part III argues that CAFA should not be applied to parens
patriae suits.  Applying CAFA to these suits contravenes the most impor-
tant motivations behind CAFA and creates unsound doctrine.
I. CAFA’S EXPANSION OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND PARENS
PATRIAE STANDING
In order to evaluate the application of CAFA to parens patriae suits,
it is important to understand both CAFA’s expansion of federal diversity
jurisdiction and parens patriae standing.  Part I.A provides a background
survey of the problems CAFA sought to address, the solutions it enacted,
and the effects of its passage.  Part I.B explores the history, purposes, and
current scope of parens patriae standing.  This material provides the
background for the question of whether CAFA allows removal of parens
patriae suits, explored in Part II, and the argument made in Part III that
reading CAFA to allow removal of these cases undermines its purposes
and is doctrinally problematic.
A. CAFA’s Removal Provisions and the Problems That Motivated Them
1. Class Action Woes. — Class action litigation has provoked con-
troversy ever since the revision of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1966.13  As the number of class action filings has in-
creased,14 so have cries for reform15 and tales of abuse.16  By expanding
the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction and allowing defendants
to remove to federal courts, CAFA did not address the broad dissatisfac-
tion with class actions.17  Instead it limited its focus to the problems asso-
13. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler et al., RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Class Action
Dilemmas:  Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 15–37 (2000) (providing history of
controversy surrounding class actions and efforts at reform).
14. John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action “Cops”:
Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1441, 1444 (2005) (noting
“exponential growth in the number of class actions”); see also Hensler et al., supra note 13, R
at 27 (“[M]ass personal injury class actions seemed to be growing in number and scope.”).
15. See, e.g., Editorial, Actions Without Class, Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 2001, at A14;
Editorial, Class-Action Plaintiffs Deserve More than Coupons, USA Today, Oct. 9, 2002, at
A12; Editorial, Class-Action Showdown, Wall St. J., July 8, 2004, at A14.
16. See Beisner & Miller, supra note 4, at 154 (noting failures in proper application of R
class certification requirements, “use of the class device as ‘judicial blackmail’ . . . and
denials of defendant’s due process rights”).
17. In fact, CAFA contained an endorsement of class actions as “an important and
valuable part of the legal system.”  Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(1), 119 Stat. 4, 4 (2005).  Some
have seen this as mere “window dressing” or a political compromise designed to secure
Democratic votes.  Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch:  The Strategic Uses of
Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1924, 1942 (2006) [hereinafter Burbank,
Aggregation] (“Less charitably, they meet the philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s definition of
‘bullshit,’ because they are made with apparent indifference to their truth content.”).
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ciated with class actions as handled by state courts.18  These problems are
both practical—concerns about the way class actions are adjudicated in
state courts—and conceptual—concerns about the very idea of adjudicat-
ing class actions in state courts.  Both will be discussed in some depth to
provide an accurate picture of the policy goals behind CAFA.
The practical concerns behind CAFA stem from two basic issues:  the
abuse of class action procedures in certain state courts and the attendant
forum shopping by plaintiffs’ attorneys.  CAFA itself contains a rebuke of
“[a]buses in class actions” by “State and local courts” that are “acting in
ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants.”19  The ac-
companying Senate Report paints a much richer picture, describing a
“parade of abuses” and accusing state court judges of being “lax” in apply-
ing Rule 23,20 of certifying frivolous class actions as a form of “black-
mail,”21 and of denying defendants their due process rights.22  Congress
also noted the problem of so-called magnet jurisdictions,23 small counties
that acquire a reputation for being plaintiff-friendly and attract more
than their fair share of class actions.24  Some empirical studies have ques-
tioned the argument that federal judges handle class actions more fairly
than state court judges,25 but others have found that there is a higher
chance of certification in state court than in federal court.26  While the
18. Some have argued that Congress’s stated goals in enacting CAFA cannot justify
the expansiveness of its removal provisions and that one should therefore be careful not to
be “fooled” by them.  Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court:  A Better
Way to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1521, 1523
(2005).  For the purposes of this Note, however, I will take Congress’s statutory language at
face value rather than ascribe to it covert motives that have no bearing on its stated policy
goals.  It seems counterproductive to simply read CAFA as a self-justifying boon to big
business whose statutory language is not to be taken seriously.
19. § 2(a)(4), 119 Stat. at 5.
20. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 6, 14 (2005).
21. Id. at 20 (“[Certification] can essentially force corporate defendants to pay
ransom to class attorneys by settling—rather than litigating—frivolous lawsuits.”); see also
Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction:  A General View 120 (1973) (calling settlements
induced by class certification “blackmail settlements”).
22. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 21–22.  The “most egregious” example being “drive-by class
certification,” in which a class is certified before the defendant “has even received the
complaint.”  Id. at 22; Schwartz, Behrens & Lorber, supra note 4, at 501–02. R
23. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 13, 22.
24. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing magnet jurisdictions). R
25. See Hensler et al., supra note 13, at 482 (“[W]e have no empirical basis for R
assessing the argument that federal judges generally manage damage class actions better
than state court judges.”); Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Fed. Judicial Ctr.,
An Empirical Examination of Attorneys’ Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation 34–36
(2005), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ClAct05.pdf/$file/ClAct
05.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that “cases were almost equally likely
to be certified” in state and federal courts and reporting slightly lower certification rate in
state courts).
26. See Nicholas M. Pace et al., RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Insurance Class Actions in
the United States 40–41 (2007) (reporting higher percentage of insurance class actions
certified in state court).
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empirical argument still rages, it is clear that Congress was persuaded by,
and acted on, evidence of plaintiff-friendly conditions in certain state
courts.
Questionable practices by plaintiffs’ attorneys were also a strong mo-
tivating force behind CAFA.  The debate over class action reform saw
invective hurled at plaintiffs’ attorneys, both for forum shopping and
for other less easily defensible practices.27  Particularly disturbing to
Congress was the practice of submitting “copy cat” filings in numerous
jurisdictions at the same time in order to find the most sympathetic
judge.28  Congress also objected to “coupon settlements,” in which law-
yers receive massive windfalls while the plaintiffs themselves receive cou-
pons that are little more than promotional tools.29  Forum shopping is of
course a legitimate tactic for lawyers,30 and is inherent in the very idea of
diversity jurisdiction;31 removal by defendants, the solution provided by
CAFA, is itself a type of forum shopping.32  As with state court miscon-
duct, there is an ongoing debate over whether the empirical evidence
supports the widespread perception of attorney misconduct.33  But the
apparent facility with which plaintiffs’ attorneys exploit the broad range
of fora available to them has always motivated calls for “tort reform” and
played a role in Congress’s enactment of CAFA.
Conceptual arguments against hearing large class actions in state
courts also played a role in CAFA’s passage.  To Congress, the litigation of
large class actions in state courts was a perversion of federalism, a viola-
tion of the “intent of the framers.”34  Before CAFA was passed, federal
diversity jurisdiction was present only when all named plaintiffs were di-
verse from all defendants.35  In cases with large national classes, plaintiffs’
27. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1593, 1593–94 (2008) (“Politicians and other CAFA proponents called class action
lawyers self-interested, unscrupulous, unprincipled, and unaccountable.” (footnotes
omitted)).
28. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 23; see also Beisner & Miller, supra note 4, at 166–68 R
(reporting widespread filing of “copy cat” class actions).
29. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 15–20.  The Senate Report contains a long list of such cases.
30. See Morrison, supra note 18, at 1524 (“If a lawyer did not at least explore the R
question of which forum is most advantageous for the client, his neglect might be
considered malpractice . . . .”); see also Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated
Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1774–75 (2008) (listing motives for
preference for state court, both strategic and otherwise).
31. Morrison, supra note 18, at 1524. R
32. Id. at 1524–25.
33. See Hensler et al., supra note 13, at 58–61 (noting that some discrepancies can be R
explained by neutral factors and some cannot).  The prevalence of petrochemical facilities
in Louisiana, for instance, might lead to a disproportionate share in certain types of
litigation.  Id.
34. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (listing among purposes of CAFA desire to “restore the intent of the
framers”).
35. Pace et al., supra note 26, at 57 (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 R
U.S. 356 (1921)).
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attorneys could therefore defeat federal diversity jurisdiction by naming
any plaintiff who resided in the same state as any defendant.36  Many saw
this situation as an “anomaly” that kept even huge cases of “inherently
federal character” out of federal court.37  Both practices were seen as
deeply troubling.38
Congress also rejected the idea of class action litigation as a legiti-
mate form of regulation.  One of the arguments advanced by opponents
of CAFA during debates was that class action litigation helps regulate
where government has failed to do so.39  Litigation in general can often
perform a regulatory function,40 and the class action is especially power-
ful in this respect.  It “does more than aggregate claims; it augments gov-
ernment policing and generates external societal benefits.”41  This justifi-
cation has many detractors.  The problems with viewing plaintiffs’ lawyers
as regulators start with their incentive structure.  An attorney general, for
instance, “is charged with promoting the public good and typically is paid
the same modest salary regardless of . . . which alleged wrongdoers he or
she chooses to pursue.”42  Private attorneys, on the other hand, are moti-
vated by fees.43  Nor can juries be trusted to act as regulators, since their
approach to individual cases is not aimed at creating optimal social pol-
icy.44  Indeed, the very concept of regulatory power for courts can be
seen as “a frightening violation of the doctrine of separation of powers
[that] undermines the checks and balances inherent in our constitu-
tional republican form of government.”45  Finally, there are empirical ar-
36. Id.
37. Beisner & Miller, supra note 4, at 145.  For a critical take on this position, see R
Morrison, supra note 18, at 1531 (arguing that this rationale “would result in wholesale R
shifts of cases from state to federal court” and noting that unwillingness to allow a single
state judge to oversee a national class action is not paired with similar concerns regarding
federal judges).
38. Once again, empirical research has questioned the scope of this problem.  See
Pace et al., supra note 26, at 59–60 (“Just 17 percent of the insurance class actions . . . filed R
in state courts sought national or several-state classes.”).
39. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 58 (2005) (“‘[T]he most important function that class
actions serve is to allow private attorneys general to step forward and hold corporations
accountable for decisions that affect the public safety.’” (quoting statement of Sen.
Biden)); Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 14, at 1442, 1451–52 (noting use of this R
argument by supporters of class actions and plaintiffs’ attorneys).
40. See W. Kip Vicusi, Overview, in Regulation through Litigation 1, 3 (W. Kip Vicusi
ed., 2002) [hereinafter Vicusi, Overview] (“[L]itigation can often help address gaps in the
regulatory structure and stimulate regulatory activity.”).
41. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29
Cardozo L. Rev. 2517, 2518–19 (2008) (arguing that class action litigation produces
“laundry list of positive externalities”).
42. Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 14, at 1443. R
43. Id.
44. See Vicusi, Overview, supra note 40, at 2 (“Recent literature has documented the R
failings of juries in thinking systematically about risk, as jurors exhibit a wide variety of
systematic biases . . . .”).
45. James Wootton, Comment, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in
Regulation Through Litigation, supra note 40, at 304; see also Schwartz, Behrens & R
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guments that groundbreaking regulatory work is not in fact what class
action lawyers really do,46 and that this justification leads public servants
like attorneys general to delegate their duties to private plaintiffs.47  Al-
though no mention is made of private attorneys general in CAFA itself,
the Senate Report flatly declared that “the concept of class actions serving
a ‘private attorney general’ or other enforcement purpose is illegal.”48
2. CAFA’s Solutions. — Congress responded to this array of problems
primarily by making it easier for defendants in class actions to remove to
federal court.49  CAFA expanded federal diversity jurisdiction over class
actions to include any case with more than 100 plaintiffs and $5 million
in controversy in which “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of
a State different from any defendant.”50  CAFA also allowed any defen-
dant to unilaterally remove a case at any time.51  However, a complex
series of provisions did place limits on the scope of the jurisdictional
grant:  “A district court may . . . decline to exercise jurisdiction” where
between one-third and two-thirds of the class members and the defend-
ants are citizens of the forum state,52 and a district court “shall decline to
Lorber, supra note 4, at 508 (“Courts are not lawmakers and are not well-equipped to R
make broad public policy decisions . . . .”).  Under this view, even the widely heralded forty-
six-state, $206 billion tobacco settlement, which imposed significant new regulations on the
industry, is seen as an illegitimate “encroachment” on the functions of legislature and
regulatory agencies.  W. Kip Vicusi, Tobacco:  Regulation and Taxation Through
Litigation, in Regulation Through Litigation, supra note 40, at 22, 23.  Indeed, Vicusi sees R
the damages award not as a simple payment to injured parties, but as a highly regressive
excise tax imposed on future buyers of cigarettes “without the usual input that
accompanies the development of policies of this type.”  Id. at 51.
46. See Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 14, at 1453 (arguing that class action R
lawyers file “‘coattail’ lawsuits that follow on the heels of government investigations”).
47. See id. at 1461 (noting “willingness of many state attorneys general to team up
with private plaintiffs’ lawyers”).
48. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 59 (2005).  Some of the objections discussed above stem
from the idea of private attorneys serving public functions, while others stem from the
inadequacy of regulation by courts in general.  For more on this distinction, see infra text
accompanying notes 167–174. R
49. In addition to its expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction and removal
provisions, CAFA also included reform of coupon settlements, 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006),
and measures aimed at both preventing loss by class members, § 1713, and settlements that
discriminate based on geographic location, § 1714.
50. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
51. See id. § 1453(b) (noting that “[s]uch action may be removed by any defendant
without the consent of all defendants” and “the 1-year limitation under section 1446(b)
shall not apply”).
52. Id. § 1332(d)(3).  District courts are instructed to base their decisions on “the
interests of justice and . . . the totality of the circumstances,” as well as the consideration of
six factors:
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which the
action was originally filed . . . ; (C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a
manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction; (D) whether the action was
brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged
harm, or the defendants; (E) whether the number of [in-state citizens] is
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exercise jurisdiction” where more than two-thirds of the class members
and a defendant are citizens of the forum state.53  The exact scope of
these exceptions has been the subject of some dispute among
commentators.54
The severity of CAFA’s impact on class action litigation is also dis-
puted.  Supporters of CAFA are quick to point to dramatic changes:  Mag-
net courts have seen class action filings plummet, and “CAFA has effec-
tively ended the practice of state court judges dictating the laws of the 49
other states.”55  Others have seen a more measured response, observing
that the increase in class actions in federal courts has been less dramatic
than expected56 and that “both the district courts and the courts of ap-
peals have resisted an expansive reading of CAFA.”57  There have also
been hints that CAFA might not prove as defendant-friendly as it set out
to be, especially if federal courts become more sympathetic to class ac-
tions58 or defendants find that conditions are more favorable in state
courts.59
substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other State . . . ; (F)
whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or
more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the
same or other persons have been filed.
Id.
53. Id. § 1332(d)(4).  Perhaps anticipating the addition of defendants with little
connection to the litigation as a way to activate this subsection, Congress noted that the
defendant mentioned here must be one “from whom significant relief is sought by
members of the plaintiff class” and “whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the
claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class.”  Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa)–(bb).
54. For instance, the inclusion of the defendants in these exceptions means that they
will not have any effect on diversity jurisdiction unless the suit has been brought in the
home state of a defendant.  Morrison, supra note 18, at 1534.  Morrison’s article was R
written before the passage of CAFA but responded to an identical proposal from the
previous year.  Id. at 1521.  Commentators have also expressed concerns about the
difficulty of applying these exceptions.  See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1782–88 (arguing R
that CAFA “bristles with difficulties” and noting burdensome discovery required to apply
exceptions); Morrison, supra note 18, at 1535 (discussing “complicated proceedings to R
determine whether the applicable percentages were met”).
55. John H. Beisner & Richard G. Rose, CAFA:  Realizing the Framers’ Goals, in The
10th Annual National Institute on Class Actions 2006, at B-23 to B-24 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2006).
56. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts:  An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1723, 1725 (2008) (“[O]ur findings may represent a less dramatic increase than
some anticipated.”); Marcus, supra note 30, at 1789 (“[A]lthough there were assertions R
that all or almost all state court class actions would end up in federal court under CAFA, at
least in some states that certainly has not been the case.”).
57. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata:  A Tale of Waste and
Politics, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1579–84 (2008) (reviewing authors’ empirical findings).
58. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1769 (“There is no particular reason to assume the R
enduring attractiveness for business interests of federal courts’, compared to state courts’,
views on class certification and related matters . . . .”); Morrison, supra note 18, at 1528–29 R
(noting historical shifts in relative sympathies of state and federal courts).
59. See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 17, at 1941 & n.118 (noting existence of R
“potential settlement burdens in federal class actions” that might dissuade defendants
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In sum, CAFA was a congressional response to specific practical and
conceptual problems with class action litigation, especially abuse by state
courts and plaintiffs’ lawyers and the affront to federalism represented by
national litigation being conducted in state court.  CAFA’s provisions
could not and did not solve all of these problems, but they are the pri-
mary policy motivations that drove the legislation.
B. The Evolving Doctrine of Parens Patriae
The doctrine of parens patriae (literally, “parent of his or her coun-
try”60) allows a state to sue in a representative capacity to protect the in-
terests of its citizens.61  Although the concept was originally quite limited,
the scope of parens patriae expanded gradually over the course of the
twentieth century and now includes a broad range of “quasi-sovereign”
interests.62  In order to appreciate why CAFA would be read to include
parens patriae suits and what the ramifications of this reading might be, it
is important to appreciate the conceptual scope of the quasi-sovereign
interests at stake.63
The concept of parens patriae derives from the English constitu-
tional system, which recognized certain powers and duties as part of the
King’s prerogative.64  The King was “the guardian of his people,” a re-
sponsibility that entitled him to act in defense of those subjects who were
unable to act for themselves.65  This category included “infants, idiots,
and lunatics” as well as charities.66  In America, the royal prerogative
from seeking removal (quoting Memorandum of Kenneth B. Forrest et al., Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Clients, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 Becomes Law (Feb.
24, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review))).
60. Black’s Law Dictionary 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
61. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602
(1982) (finding parens patriae standing based on “a set of interests that the State has in the
well-being of its populace”).
62. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 387,
393, 446–74 (1995) (tracing expansion of parens patriae standing).
63. The discussion that follows reviews the scope of state standing to sue as parens
patriae in federal court, as laid down by the Supreme Court.  State law sometimes differs
from federal law in this area, presenting some conceptual difficulties.  See infra notes
225–227 and accompanying text. R
64. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); George B. Curtis, The
Checkered Career of Parens Patriae:  The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DePaul L. Rev.
895, 896 (1976).
65. Curtis, supra note 64, at 896 (quoting J. Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the R
Prerogative of the Crown 155 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son 1820)).
66. Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 257 (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *47).
Curtis notes that the English common law concept of parens patriae was strictly limited to
these three categories (children, mental incompetents, and charities).  Curtis, supra note
64, at 896–98.  In practice it was used when the crown stood to gain financially from R
assuming wardship of infants with income-producing property; “the profit motive was
clearly at the forefront of the king’s decision to offer his protection.”  Id. at 898.
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passed to the states,67 where it remained similarly limited for roughly a
century.68  Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, the Court al-
lowed states to sue to protect the general interests of their citizens.69
The “quasi-sovereign” interest that forms the basis of modern parens
patriae standing originated in this era.  In Louisiana v. Texas, the Court
dealt with Louisiana’s challenge of a quarantine imposed by the port of
Galveston that effectively placed an embargo on goods from New
Orleans.70  Although the Court held that the case did not present a “con-
troversy,”71 it recognized that even though there was no “infringement of
the powers of the State of Louisiana, or any special injury to her prop-
erty . . . the State is entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters
complained of affect her citizens at large.”72  In Missouri v. Illinois, the
Court presented a slightly different articulation:  “[I]f the health and
comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the
proper party to represent and defend them.”73  The Missouri Court analo-
gized states to independent countries to determine that they should be
able to vindicate certain rights in federal court.74  In Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., the Court further expanded the quasi-sovereign interest to in-
clude safeguarding the environment.75  The reasoning behind both
Missouri and Tennessee Copper was that the states, by joining the Union,
had forfeited their right to deal with each other as normal sovereigns
(either through diplomacy or war) and so were granted the right to de-
67. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982) (noting recognition of concept in American courts); Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 257
(“[T]he ‘parens patriae’ function of the King passed to the States.”).
68. See Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 257 (noting first instance of expansion in 1900);
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 62, at 446 (“Around the turn of the century . . . the R
Court quietly began allowing states to vindicate in federal court their general interest in
protecting their citizens.”).
69. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 62, at 447. R
70. 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900).
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id. at 19; see also Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State:  Parens Patriae and
the Provision of Public Goods, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 805 (2009) (discussing origins of
quasi-sovereign interest).
73. 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).  The litigation arose out of the construction of an
artificial channel that reversed the flow of the Chicago River, bringing the city’s sewage
away from Lake Michigan and into the Mississippi River.  Id. at 211–12.  The Court found
that Missouri had standing to sue to prevent the arrival of “fifteen hundred tons of
poisonous undefecated sewage and filth,” id. at 214, despite the fact that the case involved
no “direct property rights belonging to the complainant State,” id. at 241.
74. Id.; see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
603–04 (1982) (explaining reasoning behind Missouri); Bradford Mank, Should States
Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New
Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701, 1760 (2008) (same).
75. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“This is a suit by a State
for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.  In that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain.”); see also Mank, supra note 74, at 1760–61 (summarizing holding of Tennessee R
Copper).
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fend their interests in federal court.76  From this premise followed a line
of cases establishing quasi-sovereign interests in preventing a wide variety
of nuisances.77
Economic interests have also been firmly established as quasi-
sovereign. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia recognized a quasi-sovereign in-
terest in access to natural gas.78 Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. was
even more expansive, counting an antitrust claim as a quasi-sovereign in-
terest because trade barriers caused harms just as serious as physical nui-
sances.79  The passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act80 allowed state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae for treble
damages in antitrust cases,81 leading to actions in a broad array of
fields.82
Parens patriae standing’s radical expansion beyond its common law
origins makes it difficult to define with precision.  In its most exhaustive
exploration of the concept, Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel.
Barez,83 the Supreme Court noted that quasi-sovereign interests could be
understood partly by comparison with what they were not:  sovereign in-
76. See Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (“When the States by their union made the
forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not . . . renounce the
possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-
sovereign interests . . . .”); Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241 (“Diplomatic powers and the right to
make war having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be expected that
upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy . . . .”).
77. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1923) (flooding);
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 298–302 (1921) (water pollution); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99–105 (1907) (water diversion). Tennessee Copper itself dealt with
the discharge of “noxious gas” from a mine that spread into Georgia, where it damaged
forests and orchards.  206 U.S. at 236.
78. 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (noting “health, comfort, and welfare” of substantial
portion of State’s population was “seriously jeopardized” by threatened interruption in
supply of gas).
79. 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (“[Trade barriers] may affect the prosperity and welfare
of a State as profoundly as any diversion of waters from rivers.  They may stifle, impede, or
cripple old industries and prevent the establishment of new ones.  They may arrest the
development of a State or put it at a decided disadvantage in competitive markets.”).
80. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (2006).  In passing this provision, Congress set aside the
Court’s resistance to the idea of allowing parens patriae suits for treble damages, a practice
it had recently banned.  Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 265 (1972); see Susan
Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories:  Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae
Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 361, 370–74
(1999) (discussing Hawaii).
82. See Farmer, supra note 81, at 362–63 (listing “broad range of consumer items” R
that have been the subject of parens patriae actions).
83. 458 U.S. 592 (1982). Snapp involved a suit brought by Puerto Rico against apple
growers in Virginia who discriminated against Puerto Rican workers in favor of Jamaicans,
violating federal law.  Id. at 597–98 & n.5.  Not being a state, Puerto Rico could not make
the traditional argument in support of parens patriae standing in federal court.  See supra
text accompanying note 76.  The Court was unconcerned by this wrinkle and noted that R
Puerto Rico “has a claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as
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terests, proprietary interests, and the interests of private parties.84  Sover-
eign interests include the exercise of power over individuals within a
state85 and issues involving relations between the states.86  States also have
proprietary interests that they may need to pursue in court.87  Finally,
states sometimes elect to pursue the interests of private parties.88  Such
interests “are obviously not in themselves sovereign interests, and they do
not become such simply by virtue of the State’s aiding in their achieve-
ment.”89  The Court noted that “[q]uasi-sovereign interests stand apart
from all three of the above”90 and concluded that “a State has a quasi-
sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and eco-
nomic—of its residents in general.”91
Parens patriae suits therefore bear an inherent resemblance to class
actions.  Like class actions, parens patriae suits necessarily involve injuries
to a group of people.92  Suits brought pursuant to quasi-sovereign inter-
strong as that of any State.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608 n.15; see also Weinstock, supra note 72, R
at 807 n.51.
84. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601–02.
85. Id.  This sovereign interest concerns “the exercise of sovereign power over
individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction—this involves the power to create
and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal.”  Id.  A State thus has standing to litigate
whenever it has the power to legislate; “there are few restrictions on the interests the state
can seek to vindicate as a litigant in enforcing its own laws.”  Woolhandler & Collins, supra
note 62, at 398.  One reading of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), suggests that R
the distinction between quasi-sovereign and sovereign interests has become functionally
irrelevant.  Weinstock, supra note 72, at 828. R
86. Snapp calls this “the demand for recognition from other sovereigns” and notes
that it most often “involves the maintenance and recognition of borders.”  458 U.S. at 601.
An early example is Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).  See also
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 62, at 415–16 (arguing that boundary disputes were R
“largely exclusive example of the early Court’s willingness to allow states to vindicate
sovereignty interests”).
87. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601–02 (“A State may, for example, own land or participate in a
business venture.  As a proprietor, it is likely to have the same interests as other similarly
situated proprietors.”).  Mank notes that although “[a] state can sue both in its individual
capacity and as parens patriae . . . the Supreme Court has treated such suits as analytically
separate.”  Mank, supra note 74, at 1763 n.358. R
88. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602.  “[T]he State must show a direct interest of its own and not
merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real parties in interest.”
Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938).
89. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602 (“In such situations, the State is no more than a nominal
party.”).  On the other hand, a State is permitted to pursue the well-being of its citizens,
who are of course private parties.  The Court has addressed this tension by noting that
there are no “definitive limits on the proportion of the population of the State that must
be adversely affected by the challenged behavior.  Although more must be alleged than
injury to an identifiable group of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury
must be considered as well . . . .”  Id. at 607.
90. Id. at 602.
91. Id. at 607.
92. See supra note 89. R
\\server05\productn\C\COL\111-1\COL103.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-NOV-10 11:03
2011] PARENS PATRIAE UNDER CAFA 133
ests are, like class actions, representative,93 and deal with harms that
would probably not lead to individual lawsuits.94  Indeed, attorneys gen-
eral often hire plaintiffs’ lawyers to help prosecute parens patriae suits.95
On the other hand, parens patriae suits do not involve a set class of citi-
zens, nor are they required to satisfy Rule 23 or state equivalents.  Still,
the conceptual similarity between the two is unavoidable.
II. THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING CAFA TO PARENS PATRIAE SUITS
CAFA contained no explicit reference to parens patriae suits, and
the question of whether it allows their removal presents an important
issue.  Part II.A explores the arguments made by courts on both sides of
this issue, with particular attention given to the Fifth Circuit’s ground-
breaking conclusion, in Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co.,96
that such suits are removable.  Part II.B argues that the Fifth Circuit’s
approach is highly problematic, both as an extension of CAFA and from
the perspective of federalism.  This Part provides a foundation for Part
III, which argues that courts should not apply CAFA to parens patriae
suits when those suits are based on legitimate quasi-sovereign interests.
A. Does CAFA Authorize Removal of Parens Patriae Suits?
1. The Majority View:  CAFA Does Not Apply. — Most courts and com-
mentators who have examined the issue have concluded that CAFA does
not allow for the removal of parens patriae suits.  Some note that CAFA
simply did not mention such suits and therefore should not apply to
them.97  Others read one of CAFA’s provisions as specifically exempting
93. See Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 115, 122 (2006) (“[A] ‘parens patriae’ action may resemble a
class action in that an attorney general is representing a state’s citizens . . . .”).
94. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (“That suits brought by
individuals, each for personal injuries . . . would be wholly inadequate and
disproportionate remedies, requires no argument.”).
95. See Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature:  State Attorneys General
and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 913, 964 (2008) (“In most but not all
instances of parens patriae litigation against product manufacturers, state attorneys general
or municipal officials have hired private attorneys . . . to prosecute the litigation for
them.”); Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the
Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1859, 1861 (2000)
(noting collaboration between attorneys general and plaintiffs’ lawyers in tobacco
litigation).
96. 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
97. See, e.g., Puiszis, supra note 93, at 122 (arguing, with respect to parens patriae R
suits, that “where a lawsuit is not filed as a class action, CAFA does not apply even if for all
intents and purposes it resembles one” (citing Tedder v. Beverly Enter., No.
3:05CV00264SWW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38694, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 12, 2005) (holding
CAFA does not apply where suit “was not filed under Rule 23 or similar state statute as a
class action”))).
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them.98  This provision holds that “the term ‘mass action’ shall not in-
clude any civil action in which all of the claims in the action are asserted
on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claim-
ants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifi-
cally authorizing such action.”99  At least one court has indeed read this
subsection as preventing removal of representative suits,100 but it has not
been held to apply to parens patriae suits specifically.101
CAFA’s legislative history has also been interpreted to exclude
parens patriae suits.  During debates over CAFA, an amendment was pro-
posed that specifically exempted “any civil action brought by, or on be-
half of, any attorney general.”102  The amendment was rejected, but the
principal argument made against it was that it was simply unnecessary:  It
was already clear that the statute did not apply.103  To some courts, this
98. See Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Class Action Jurisdiction After CAFA, Exxon Mobil
and Grable, 8 Del. L. Rev. 157, 180–81 (2006) (listing parens patriae suits as “carved out” of
CAFA); Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision:  Optimal Regulatory
Policy?, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1971, 1979 n.33 (2008) (“[CAFA] contains an exception for
parens patriae actions.”).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III) (2006).
100. See Breakman v. AOL, 545 F. Supp. 2d 96, 101 (D.D.C. 2008). Breakman
involved a representative suit by a private citizen brought pursuant to specific legislative
authorization rather than a parens patriae suit by an attorney general.  Id. at 100.
Breakman’s suit was “representative” in that he sought relief “for each individual District of
Columbia consumer” pursuant to a “private attorney general provision.”  Id.  Nevertheless,
the court concluded that “because [this action] does not fall within the definition of a mass
action,” it could not be removed under CAFA.  Id. at 102.
101. This exception might not apply to most parens patriae actions for two reasons:
(1) many such actions are based on court-made standing doctrine rather than statutory
grants of authority, see supra Part I.B, and (2) parens patriae actions based on quasi-
sovereign interests necessarily involve the interests of a group of individuals and are often
not asserted solely “on behalf of the general public,” see, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son v.
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 597–98 (1982) (involving suit based on
discrimination against discrete number of Puerto Rican apple pickers).  Still, it is perhaps
odd that this provision was neither discussed by the court in Allstate, 536 F.3d 418, nor
mentioned in the plaintiff’s briefs, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Allstate, 536 F.3d 418 (No.
08-30465).
102. 151 Cong. Rec. S1157 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005).  Forty-six attorneys general wrote
to Congress in support of the amendment, arguing that “certain provisions of S. 5 might be
misinterpreted to hamper the ability of the Attorneys General to bring such actions,
thereby impeding one means of protecting our citizens from unlawful activity and its
resulting harm.”  Id. at S1158–59.
103. This was one of the principal arguments made by CAFA’s sponsors, Senators
Grassley and Hatch:
One reason this amendment is not necessary is because our bill will not affect
those lawsuits. . . . The key phrase . . . is “class action.”  Hence, because almost all
civil suits brought by State attorneys general are parens patriae suits, similar
representative suits or direct enforcement actions, it is clear they do not fall
within this definition.  That means that cases brought by State attorneys general
will not be affected by this bill.
Id. at S1163 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
These suits, known commonly as parens patriae cases, are similar to class actions
to the extent that the attorney general represents a large group of people.  But let
\\server05\productn\C\COL\111-1\COL103.txt unknown Seq: 15 30-NOV-10 11:03
2011] PARENS PATRIAE UNDER CAFA 135
history has provided convincing evidence that parens patriae suits are
simply outside the scope of CAFA.  In Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc.,104 the
Attorney General and Director of Consumer Affairs of New Jersey sued
Blockbuster in state court, alleging that the company’s advertisements
(which promised “The End of Late Fees”) violated state consumer fraud
law.105  The district court rejected Blockbuster’s argument that CAFA
granted federal jurisdiction, concluding, based on the legislative history,
that the suit was simply “not a class action as defined by the statute.”106
One other district court reached a similar conclusion, granting a motion
to remand because “[t]his is a state enforcement action, and CAFA does
not apply to such actions.”107
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Approach: Katrina Canal and Allstate. — The
only circuit court that has considered the question reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that CAFA does allow removal of parens patriae ac-
tions.  The Fifth Circuit began its examination of the issue in In re Katrina
Canal Litigation Breaches, a class action filed in state court that named
Louisiana and numerous citizens as plaintiffs.108  The court held that fed-
eral jurisdiction existed, since the state’s use of itself as the named repre-
sentative for a class of plaintiffs did not alter the fact that the case was still
a class action and therefore removable under CAFA.109
In Allstate, the court confronted the issue of parens patriae litigation
directly.110 Allstate arose out of a lawsuit filed by Louisiana against a host
me be perfectly clear that they are not class actions. . . . [T]he bill applies only to
class actions, and not parens patriae actions.
Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch).  The immediate rejoinder, advanced by the sponsor of the
amendment, was that if the amendment did not alter the meaning of CAFA there could be
no objection to its inclusion.  Id. at S1165 (statement of Sen. Pryor).  Senators Grassley and
Hatch responded by arguing that it would be exploited:  “That creates a very serious
loophole in this bill.  We should not risk creating a situation where State attorneys general
can be used as pawns so that crafty class action lawyers can avoid the jurisdictional
provisions of this bill.”  Id. at S1163 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
104. 384 F. Supp. 2d 749 (D.N.J. 2005).
105. Id. at 751.
106. Id. at 752–54.
107. Connecticut v. Moody’s Corp., No. 3:08CV1314, 2009 WL 3245888, at *5 (D.
Conn. Sept. 30, 2009) (citing Blockbuster, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 752–54).
108. In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 2008).  Louisiana
sued more than 200 insurance companies for failing to pay claims relating to damages
from Hurricane Katrina.  Under the state-administered (and federally-funded) Road
Home program, homeowners could receive an advance on their insurance payments if
they assigned their claims against their insurers in the amount of the advance.  The State
also gained the right to sue the insurer in the name of the policyholder.  Id. at 702–03.
109. Id. at 705–06.  The court admitted that states are not treated as persons for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, but found this argument unavailing:  “CAFA only
requires that the action be brought under Rule 23 or a state statute that authorizes class
actions to be brought by a person.”  Id. at 705.  In other words, it is not required that the
named plaintiff be a person, only that he might be.
110. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
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of insurance companies alleging decades of antitrust violations.111  Un-
like in Katrina Canal, the state did not establish a plaintiff class, instead
calling the action a parens patriae suit brought pursuant to Louisiana
law.112  As a threshold matter, the court determined that CAFA did not
exempt actions brought by states.113  This conclusion was based on the
debate surrounding the amendment, proposed and rejected, that would
have provided such an exemption.114  Where other courts focused on the
insistence by CAFA’s sponsors that the amendment was simply unneces-
sary,115 the Allstate court found more persuasive the idea that the amend-
ment was rejected because it would have created a loophole that could be
exploited by plaintiffs’ lawyers.116
Reading in CAFA a mandate to avoid taking the complaint at face
value, the court approved the district court’s decision to “pierce the
pleadings”117 and then determined that the policyholders, not the state,
were the real parties in interest.118  The court therefore found that it
could treat those policyholders as parties to the litigation for purposes of
CAFA removal, despite the fact that they were not actually named.119
111. Louisiana charged the insurance companies with adopting a strategy developed
by McKinsey & Company in which they employed a range of tactics (including price fixing)
to consistently undervalue insurance claims and increase profits, particularly in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina.  Id. at 422–23.
112. See id. at 428 (noting statutory and constitutional authority).
113. Id. at 423–24.
114. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing congressional debate R
concerning amendment).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 104–107. R
116. See 536 F.3d at 424 (“If this legislation enables State attorneys general to keep all
class actions in State court, it will not take long for plaintiffs’ lawyers to figure out that all
they need to do to avoid the impact of [CAFA] is to persuade a State attorney general to
simply lend the name of his or her office to a private class action.” (quoting 151 Cong. Rec.
S1163–64 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch))).
117. Id. at 424–25 (“Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a
removal to Federal court where one has that right . . . .” (quoting Wecker v. Nat’l
Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907))).
118. Id. at 429 (“Accordingly, we agree with the district court and hold that . . . the
policyholders, and not the State, are the real parties in interest.”).  The court seemed to
feel that this was particularly true in relation to the treble damages, admitting that “[i]f
Louisiana were only seeking [injunctive relief], which is clearly on behalf of the State, its
argument that it is the only real party in interest would be much more compelling.”  Id. at
430.
119. Id. at 429.  The court argued that “Louisiana’s argument that it is the only real
party in interest is belied by the petition it filed in state court, which makes clear that it is
seeking to recover damages suffered by individual policyholders.”  Id.  The petition
mentioned did not contain a list of policyholders and the damages they suffered but rather
various statements that the court found indicative of the fact that the policyholders were
the real parties in interest.  These statements were general allegations of the wrongs
suffered by the policyholders at the hands of the insurance companies.  For instance,
according to the court, the petition alleged that “insurers have combined to accumulate
vast wealth for themselves . . . by violating their fiduciary duties to their insureds” and that
“[d]efendant Insurers intentionally deflate the value of the damaged property payments
owed to Louisiana insureds.”  Id. at 429 n.9.
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With the policyholders involved, the court was able to conclude that the
suit qualified as a “mass action” under CAFA, since it involved the “claims
of more than 100 Louisiana citizens who are minimally diverse from
Defendants.”120
The court also reviewed at some length the doctrine of parens pa-
triae.121  Focusing in particular on the Supreme Court cases of Hawaii
and Snapp,122 the court summed up the law by noting that while a state
could not “sue for the particular benefit of a limited number of citi-
zens,”123 it was the real party in interest when it was seeking redress for an
injury that it “either has addressed or would likely attempt to address
through its laws to further the ‘well-being of its populace.’”124
Crucially, the court did not conclude that Louisiana lacked parens
patriae standing to bring the case.  It accepted the argument that
Louisiana “has statutory and constitutional authority to bring parens pa-
triae antitrust actions,”125 even with regard to the treble damages.126
That, however, did not end the case.  At the heart of the decision was the
idea that even if the State possessed legitimate parens patriae authority to
bring a suit, the shadowy presence of other real parties in interest could
create a basis for removal under CAFA.127  It was the policyholders who
120. Id. at 430.  Neither the plaintiffs’ briefs nor the court’s decision mentioned
CAFA’s exemption of claims “asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf
of individual claimants or members of a purported class).”  28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III) (2006); see supra note 101 (discussing this provision).  This may R
have been because the suit was based on the injuries of a subset of citizens, rather than the
“general public” in the purest sense.
121. Allstate, 536 F.3d at 425–28.
122. Id. at 426–27. Hawaii and California v. Frito-Lay, 474 F.2d 774, 776–77 (9th Cir.
1973), both limited the scope of the quasi-sovereign interest in pursuing citizens’
economic rights.  These cases were immediately followed by the passage of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act, which effectively set aside the courts’ resistance to this idea.  See supra notes
80–81 and accompanying text.  The Fifth Circuit saw two sources of parens patriae R
authority, the common law doctrine and statutory grants, which it treated as distinct and
independent. Allstate, 536 F.3d at 427 n.5 (“[T]he statutory parens patriae right of action is
broader than the common law right.”).  For this reason the court was able to treat Hawaii
and Frito-Lay as good law regarding the common law doctrine of parens patriae, even if
they had been overridden by statutory changes.  The court also hinted that this distinction
may have been important in its analysis, noting that Louisiana did not have a state
equivalent of Hart-Scott-Rodino and that “[t]his court has never addressed whether such a
statute could shield a representative action from removal under CAFA.”  Id. at 428 n.5.
123. Allstate, 536 F.3d at 428 (quoting Land O’Lakes Creameries v. La. State Bd. of
Health, 160 F. Supp. 387, 388 (E.D. La. 1958)).
124. Id. (quoting Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749, 755 (D.N.J. 2005)).
125. Id. at 428–29 (citing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:138 (2003) (empowering Attorney
General to enforce antitrust provisions) and La. Const. art. IV, § 8 (granting Attorney
General power to “institute, prosecute, or intervene in any civil action or proceeding”)).
126. The court noted the vigorous debate between the parties on this point but
concluded that it “need not address that issue.”  Id. at 429.
127. See id. (“Even assuming arguendo that the Attorney General has standing to bring
such a representative action, the narrow issue before this court is who are the real parties
in interest:  the individual policyholders or the State.”).
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mattered, not the state.  The rule laid down by the Fifth Circuit can there-
fore be summed up as follows:  A parens patriae case is removable under
CAFA as a “mass action” if, ignoring the presence of the state, the court
determines that there are other real parties in interest who satisfy CAFA’s
requirements.128
3. Other Approaches: Illinois v. SDS West Corp. — One district court
has also addressed the problem of applying CAFA to parens patriae suits
by looking to the real parties in interest, but with a radically different
result.  In Illinois v. SDS West Corp., which arose out of a suit against two
California companies for consumer fraud,129 the court agreed that
Illinois had a legitimate quasi-sovereign interest.130  While recognizing
the argument that it was dealing with a “two hat” case, in which the inter-
ests of numerous citizens were also implicated, the court declined to fol-
low the approach of Allstate.131  Instead of analyzing each type of relief
separately, the court looked “at the essential nature and effect of the com-
plaint as a whole” and concluded that Illinois was the real party in inter-
est, granting the request for remand.132  In other words, the court
seemed to suggest that when the state is a real party in interest, other
alleged parties will not count for purposes of diversity jurisdiction; only
the legitimacy of the state’s interest matters.133
B. Removing Parens Patriae Cases:  Why Allstate’s Approach is Problematic
The approach to removal of parens patriae cases adopted by Allstate
is awkward in several respects.  Applying CAFA’s jurisdictional rules to
allow removal based on the presence of “real parties in interest” who are
not before the court is unsound doctrine, both because it is inconsistent
with the nature of parens patriae litigation and because it fails to articu-
late a useful, workable test.  It also expands the scope of CAFA in a way
that cannot be justified by CAFA’s underlying goals; in fact, it may under-
cut those goals.  Finally, it creates federalism problems, forcing states to
appear in federal court without their consent and making them depen-
dant on federal courts for the enforcement of their own laws.
128. The narrowest possible reading of Allstate is that it applies only when the state
seeks treble damages in antitrust actions, but the court did not explicitly limit itself to such
situations.  How broadly the court would apply the real parties in interest inquiry to allow
removal is therefore an open question.  This issue is explored infra at note 138. R
129. 640 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1049 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
130. Id. at 1050–51.
131. Id. at 1052.
132. Id. at 1052–53.
133. Id. (“[T]he bulk of the relief . . . inures solely to the State of Illinois (actually, to
its consumers but, because of quasi-sovereign interests, that is the same thing).  This
qualifies as a ‘substantial interest’ sufficient to render Illinois the real party in interest
regardless of its concurrent and subsidiary pursuit of relief on behalf of certain individual
citizens.”).  This reasoning allowed the court to avoid reaching the question of whether the
group of harmed consumers brought the case within CAFA’s jurisdictional ambit.
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1. The Allstate Approach Is Conceptually Inconsistent with the Nature of
Parens Patriae Litigation. — At the heart of Allstate was the determination
that the policyholders were the real parties in interest.134  This allowed
the court to treat the policyholders as parties to the litigation for pur-
poses of removal under CAFA without denying the Attorney General’s
authority to bring the suit as parens patriae.135  Throughout its analysis,
the court phrased its real party in interest inquiry in absolute terms, im-
plying that the real party in interest must be either the state or the policy-
holders, but not both.136  But all parens patriae actions, if they are based
on legitimate quasi-sovereign interests, necessarily stem from a mixture of
private and public interests; this is what makes them quasi-sovereign and
neither fully sovereign nor fully private.137  Every parens patriae action
therefore stems from an injury to a group of individuals who could legiti-
mately be said to be real parties in interest.138 Snapp, the quintessential
parens patriae case in the Court’s recent jurisprudence, is a perfect exam-
ple.139  Under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, the farmers in Snapp who lost
their jobs because of the discrimination that formed the basis of the law-
suit would be real parties in interest, rendering the case a “mass action”
under CAFA.140
134. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 430 (5th Cir. 2008);
supra Part II.A.2.
135. Allstate, 536 F.3d at 430.  One possible, and more narrow, reading of the holding
that might offset some of this criticism is that it applies only to parens patriae suits that are
based on common law quasi-sovereign interests, not statutory grants of authority.  See id. at
427 n.5 (distinguishing cases brought pursuant to statutory authority); supra note 122 R
(discussing this distinction).  On the other hand, the court elsewhere insisted that it could
reach the same outcome “[e]ven assuming arguendo that the Attorney General has
standing to bring such a representative action.” Allstate, 536 F.3d at 429.
136. See supra note 127.  For instance, the court asked whether the real parties in R
interest were “the individual policyholders or the State.” Allstate, 536 F.3d at 429 (emphasis
added).  It also held that “the policyholders, and not the State, are the real parties in
interest.”  Id. (emphasis added).
137. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
601–02 (1982) (noting that quasi-sovereign interests are neither solely private nor solely
sovereign); supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text (describing range of interests courts
have considered quasi-sovereign).
138. A real party in interest is anyone who has the right to prosecute an action.  Fed.
R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.”); 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1543 (3d ed.
2009) (“The effect of this passage is that the action must be brought by the person who,
according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the right.”).  The court
based its conclusion on the fact that the statute authorizing treble damages for antitrust
violations entitled “any person who is injured in his business or property” to enforce the
law. Allstate, 536 F.3d at 429 (quoting Louisiana Monopolies Act § 137, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 51:137 (2003)).  Of course, the Monopolies Act also entitles the Attorney General to
bring “all suits for the enforcement of this Part.”  La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:138; see supra
note 125. R
139. 458 U.S. 592; see supra notes 83–91 and accompanying text (discussing Snapp). R
140. The growers certainly had a right to pursue the action themselves, Puerto Rico
ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 928, 934 (W.D. Va. 1979), rev’d,
632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex
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It seems likely that under this approach the vast majority of parens
patriae cases would be removable under CAFA.  While the Court has de-
clined to set “definitive limits on the proportion of the population of the
State that must be adversely affected by the challenged behavior,” a quasi-
sovereign interest cannot be based solely on “injury to an identifiable
group of individual residents.”141  It would therefore seem unlikely that a
quasi-sovereign interest could or would be based on injury to less than
100 citizens or involve less than $5 million in controversy, the thresholds
for activation of CAFA.142  When the focus is on real parties in interest, all
the Court’s classic parens patriae cases begin to seem like removable class
actions.143 Allstate therefore fails to articulate a test that performs any
meaningful line-drawing function in the context of parens patriae
litigation.
2. Allstate Fails to Articulate a Test That Can Be Applied in the Context of
Parens Patriae Suits. — Applying CAFA’s complex framework to parens
patriae suits also presents significant practical difficulties.  CAFA has been
accused of being difficult to apply even in typical class actions.144  The
most prominent example is the series of requirements that make remand
mandatory or discretionary based on whether two-thirds or one-third, re-
spectively, of the plaintiff class are citizens of the forum state.145  Such
provisions have been attacked for requiring “complicated proceedings” at
early stages of class action litigation;146 when there is no plaintiff class,
the problem is even worse.147  On a purely practical level, then, Allstate’s
test is likely to present significant difficulties in application.
3. This Expansion Does Not Comport with CAFA’s Goals. — Further, the
Allstate approach cannot be justified based on CAFA’s underlying goals.
The public policy concerns that motivated the passage of CAFA can be
broken into two basic categories:  practical and conceptual.148  On a prac-
rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (noting lawsuits filed by individual workers), although the
Fourth Circuit later questioned the practical efficacy of this approach, 632 F.2d at 370
(“They would, at best, achieve a piecemeal solution . . . .”).
141. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)–(6) (2006).  At least one defendant would also have to
be a citizen of a different state.  Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
143. The citizens of Missouri who were injured by the flow of sewage from Illinois in
Missouri v. Illinois could be seen as a removable class.  See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208,
211–12 (1901) (describing injuries to people and businesses); supra note 73 and R
accompanying text.  The same could be said of the group of citizens who were deprived of
access to natural gas in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.  See 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (“The[ ]
[citizens’] health, comfort and welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened
withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream.”); supra note 78 and accompanying text. R
144. See supra note 54. R
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)–(4).  Remand is only mandatory, though, if one of the
principal defendants is also a citizen of the forum state.  Id. § 1332(d)(4).
146. Morrison, supra note 18, at 1535. R
147. Presumably the court would first determine the real parties in interest and then
treat them as the plaintiff class.
148. See supra Part I.A.1.
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tical level, Congress was concerned about the activities of both state
judges149 and plaintiffs’ attorneys in handling class action litigation.150
On a conceptual level, Congress objected to the idea of state courts han-
dling national class actions and the idea of the class action as a form of
regulation.151  None of these concerns is equally applicable to parens pa-
triae litigation.
Congress’s concerns with the handling of class action litigation by
state judges do not apply to parens patriae litigation.  Particularly troub-
ling to Congress was the apparent frequency152 and rapidity153 with
which certain state judges granted class certification.  Parens patriae liti-
gation does not involve the preliminary judicial decision of certifying a
class, so there is less opportunity for state judges to be overly receptive to
the lawsuits154 or grant “drive by certification” in a way that is unfair to
defendants.155  The phenomenon of magnet courts, which attract more
than their fair share of class actions because of a reputation for being
plaintiff-friendly, also troubled Congress.156  But this problem is similarly
diminished in parens patriae litigation, since an attorney general can
choose only from the courts of his state and therefore cannot cross the
country to make use of a notorious magnet court.157
Plaintiffs’ attorneys took advantage of the broad range of fora availa-
ble to them in large class actions in similarly disturbing ways, but again
these problems are not present in parens patriae litigation.  In particular,
attorneys often filed “copy cat” lawsuits in numerous jurisdictions to in-
crease their chances of certification.158  Again, the range of jurisdictions
available in parens patriae litigation is much smaller, rendering this less
149. See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text. R
150. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. R
151. See supra notes 34–38 (state courts handling national class actions), 39–48 (class R
actions as regulation), and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 20, 26, and accompanying text. R
153. See supra note 22 (discussing “drive-by” certifications). R
154. Of course, state court judges are not perfectly neutral as long as they are not
certifying a class; judicial bias might be problematic in any phase of litigation.  In certifying
a class, judges perform an important gatekeeping function, screening out frivolous class
actions.  It is this function (and the potential for its abuse) that is not present in parens
patriae litigation.
155. Granting class certification on the same day a request for it is filed, and before
the defense has a chance to respond, gives plaintiffs an advantage that borders on coercive.
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.  A parens patriae suit may be equally R
daunting to a defendant (the suit having the resources of the state behind it and
presumably a large amount in controversy), but there is no procedural element unique to
parens patriae litigation by which state court judges could manifest unfair bias in an
equally coercive way.
156. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. R
157. Certain courts within a state may be “plaintiff-friendly” and therefore attract
more than their fair share of litigation, but the problem is inherently reduced fifty-fold.
158. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. R
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of an issue.159  The incentive structure of plaintiffs’ attorneys, which often
left them with a huge windfall and class members with worthless slips of
paper, was also seen as a problem.160  Attorneys general, by contrast, do
not themselves receive commissions and so have no motivation to accept
settlements that enrich them personally at the expense of their clients.161
They are also politically accountable and “may be voted out of office if
their constituents disagree with their enforcement decisions.”162
Congress’s conceptual objections to the handling of large class ac-
tions in state courts also do not apply with equal force to parens patriae
litigation.  One major concern regarded the potential for state courts to
either create national law by applying their laws to national class ac-
tions163 or to interpret the laws of other states, thereby telling other states
the meaning of their laws.164  In parens patriae litigation these concerns
are minimized.  Because courts are not dealing with a national class of
plaintiffs, they do not turn state law into national law.165  Nor would they
have the same opportunity to interpret and apply the laws of other
states.166
159. Plaintiffs’ attorneys can still file numerous lawsuits based on the same facts.  This
seems to be what happened in Allstate (and may have contributed to the outcome).
Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 423 (2008) (“[S]everal other
similar purported class actions are . . . pending before the same federal district court,
where the same group of lawyers filed . . . nearly identical claims as those alleged in this
case . . . .”).  What is not an issue here is the problem of filing the same lawsuit in scattered
jurisdictions around the country.
160. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. R
161. See Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 14, at 1443 (“A government enforcer is R
charged with promoting the public good and typically is paid the same modest salary
regardless of (1) which alleged wrongdoers he or she chooses to pursue, and (2) the size of
any settlement or verdict he or she obtains.”).
162. Id. at 1456.
163. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1804 (citing Linda Silberman, Can the State of R
Minnesota Bind the Nation?:  Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Hague, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 103 (1981)) (noting that Minnesota could “[b]ind the
[n]ation” using state court class action).  An example is Mooney v. Allianz Life Insurance
Co., 244 F.R.D. 531, 534–35 (D. Minn. 2007), in which Minnesota law was applied to the
claims of non-Minnesota class members against a Minnesota company.
164. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005) (“[M]any state courts freely issue rulings in
class action cases that have nationwide ramifications, sometimes overturning well-
established laws and policies of other jurisdictions.”); id. at 61 (“Why should a state court
judge elected by the several thousand residents of a small county in Alabama tell New York
or California the meaning of their laws?”).
165. Courts still apply their laws to nonresident defendants, but parens patriae
litigation does not involve the application of state law to the claims of foreign plaintiffs
against a foreign company.
166. Parens patriae litigation does not eliminate choice of law issues, but it does
minimize them as compared with class action litigation.  In national class actions, plaintiffs
have the option of filing the litigation in any state where a class member happens to reside,
virtually guaranteeing—due to the forum’s minimal connection to the litigation—that the
state court will be applying the law of another state.  Parens patriae litigation, necessarily
based on injuries to the well-being of one state’s citizens, presents a much less complex
picture.
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Congressional discomfort with the idea of the class action as regula-
tion is also minimized somewhat with parens patriae litigation.  Support-
ers of class action litigation have long trumpeted its power as a regulatory
tool,167 but Congress explicitly rejected this argument during the passage
of CAFA, calling it “illegal.”168  One major argument was that the incen-
tive structure of private attorneys does not make them well-suited to pur-
suing the public good.169  This argument does not apply to attorneys gen-
eral,170 and in fact many who advanced it suggested that the regulatory
powers of litigation be left to attorneys general and not private attor-
neys.171  On the other hand, many of the objections to regulatory class
actions, like the inability of juries to act as regulators172 and the imper-
missibility of usurping the role of the legislature,173 were grounded in the
very idea of litigation as regulation, and these arguments apply with equal
force to parens patriae litigation.174
The debate surrounding the rejection of the amendment that would
have explicitly exempted parens patriae suits from CAFA provides the
most direct insight into congressional views on this subject.  The repeated
insistence by CAFA’s sponsors that it was not intended to apply to parens
patriae litigation is certainly indicative, at the very least, of the intended
scope of the legislation.175  Besides suggesting that it was unnecessary,
Senators Grassley and Hatch argued that the amendment would create a
loophole for plaintiffs’ lawyers, allowing them to keep a class action out
of federal court provided they had the cooperation of an attorney gen-
eral.176  The implication is that what concerned them was not true parens
patriae suits, but merely class action litigation to which an attorney gen-
eral had lent his name as a procedural ruse.  This strongly supports the
holding of Katrina Canal, in which the Fifth Circuit held that a class ac-
tion suit could be subject to CAFA despite the fact that the state had
167. See supra notes 39–41. R
168. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 59.
169. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
170. See supra notes 42, 161, and accompanying text (noting that attorneys general R
are charged with serving the public and receive modest salaries).
171. See generally Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 14 (arguing that private R
attorneys general should work under similar incentives and ethical constraints as attorneys
general proper if they are to claim regulatory or enforcement function).
172. See supra note 44. R
173. See supra note 45. R
174. The tobacco settlement, for instance, ended forty-six separate actions by state
attorneys general.  It has been attacked as an illegitimate encroachment on the role of the
legislature.  See supra note 45.  Although Congress certainly rejected the idea of regulatory R
class actions to the extent that it was used as an argument against CAFA itself, nothing in
CAFA indicates congressional action against regulatory litigation on the part of state
attorneys general.
175. See supra note 103 (citing remarks to this effect by CAFA’s sponsors). R
176. See supra note 116. R
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joined as one of the named parties,177 while undermining the holding of
Allstate, which theoretically allows CAFA to apply to all parens patriae liti-
gation.178  The problems that motivated the passage of CAFA were
problems specific to class action litigation; those problems do not gener-
ally support an expansion of CAFA to all parens patriae litigation.
4. Allstate’s Holding Creates Federalism Issues. — The Fifth Circuit’s
reading of CAFA to allow removal of parens patriae suits also raises new
issues of federalism and state sovereign immunity.  A state is not consid-
ered to be a citizen for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction,179 and
before CAFA complete diversity was required as well.180  These require-
ments meant that suits like those brought in Katrina Canal and Allstate, in
which the state joined as a plaintiff or brought suit itself as parens patriae,
were not subject to removal unless they involved federal questions.181  As
the panel noted in Katrina Canal, no court had confronted the precise
issue of whether state sovereign immunity protected a state from removal
under diversity jurisdiction, because the situation could not have arisen
until CAFA expanded federal jurisdiction to include cases with minimal
diversity.182
Determining whether the Eleventh Amendment grants the state any
immunity from removal involves two related questions:  whether the
state’s sovereign immunity is implicated at all and, if it is, whether the
state has waived it.  As a purely textual matter, the Eleventh Amendment
seems to restrict only suits against states, not suits brought by states.183  As
a matter of interpretation, though, the Eleventh Amendment has been
held “to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . .
177. In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2008); see supra note
108. R
178. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008); see
supra Part II.B.1.  The difficulty that arises is distinguishing jurisdictional gamesmanship
from “legitimate” parens patriae suits.  See infra Part III.
179. Postal Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894) (“A State is not a citizen. . . .
[A] suit between a State and a citizen or a corporation of another State is not between
citizens of different States; and . . . the Circuit Court of the United States has no
jurisdiction of it, unless it arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States.”).  The suit in Postal Telegraph was “one brought by the State to recover taxes and
penalties imposed by its own revenue laws, the jurisdiction over which belongs to its own
tribunals” except where Congress has provided otherwise.  Id.
180. See supra note 35. R
181. See Katrina Canal, 524 F.3d at 706 (noting that non-personhood of states and
“companion insistence upon complete diversity[ ] made the presence of additional parties
aligned with the State irrelevant to federal diversity jurisdiction”).
182. Id. (“CAFA . . . pushes the question forward . . . .”).  The court noted that the
issue, stated most strongly, was “the insulating force of any sovereign immunity of the State
of Louisiana from removal of a suit filed by it alone in its own state courts, seeking
enforcement of its state laws against insurers who each qualified to do business in the State
and are subject to its regulation.”  Id.
183. U.S. Const. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State . . . .”).
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which it confirms.”184  Sovereign immunity as a concept derives from
the very structure of the Constitution and not from the Eleventh
Amendment; its scope “is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment
alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional de-
sign.”185  It has therefore been expanded beyond the bounds that a literal
reading would support.  In Hans v. Louisiana, for instance, the Court held
that sovereign immunity protects a state not just from suits “by citizens of
another state,” as the Eleventh Amendment says, but also from suits by a
state’s own citizens.186  Generally speaking, the Court has read in the
Constitution a broad grant of sovereign immunity, one that extends far
beyond the bounds of the text.187
The concept of sovereign immunity has at its core certain key con-
cerns that have helped demarcate its scope.  One key concern is the pro-
tection it affords a state’s dignity.  The dignity interest in sovereign immu-
nity stems partly from a conception of power:  In Blackstone’s view, the
King could not be sued because “no court can have jurisdiction over
him.”188  This aspect of English political theory “was universal in the
States when the Constitution was drafted,”189 and the states were resistant
to the idea of a “new federal sovereign” that would subject them to suits
“like lower English lords.”190  Under this view of sovereign immunity,
much turns on the idea of a state’s consent,191 and states are said to have
184. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native
Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
185. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999).  The Court explained that “[b]ehind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. . . . There
is also the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall
be immune from suits, without their consent . . . .”  Id. (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 322 (1933)).
186. 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (rejecting idea that “when the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in
the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was
indignantly repelled”).
187. See Virginia F. Milstead, State Sovereign Immunity and the Plaintiff State:  Does
the Eleventh Amendment Bar Removal of Actions Filed in State Court?, 38 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 513, 515 (2004) (noting consistent expansion of sovereign immunity).
188. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *242–*243 (“[N]o suit or action can be
brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over
him.”).
189. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715–16.
190. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418 (1979).
191. The Federalist No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent.”).
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a dignity interest in not being “called,”192 “haled,”193 or “dragged”194 into
federal court.
To some extent this aspect of sovereign immunity becomes indistin-
guishable from the question of waiver.  Even if sovereign immunity does
apply, a state can waive it in various ways, including through litigation,195
but saying that a state has waived sovereign immunity by filing suit in state
court amounts to the same thing as saying that the Eleventh Amendment
simply does not protect states when they act as plaintiffs.  The dignity
aspect of sovereign immunity, though, might suggest that the waiver al-
leged here—the filing of a suit in state court—should be seen as limited
to state court.  If a state must consent to appear in federal court, then the
dignity interest as articulated by the Court might tolerate a distinction
between a voluntary appearance in state court and a subsequent involun-
tary appearance in federal court.196  A state might choose to appear as a
plaintiff in state court without consenting to subject itself to the jurisdic-
tion of a higher sovereign.197  When a defendant removes, the state is
therefore being dragged into a federal court involuntarily, just as if it
were being sued there.  This argument has been unavailing in every cir-
cuit court to have considered it,198 but it has never before arisen in the
192. “It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.” Alden, 527 U.S.
at 717 (quoting 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co.
1866) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates] (statement of James Madison at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention)).
193. “[The Eleventh Amendment] plainly protects states from being haled into
federal courts as defendants.”  California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, 375 F.3d 831, 844–45
(9th Cir. 2004).
194. “It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before
a court.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 718 (quoting Elliot’s Debates, supra note 192, at 555 R
(statement of John Marshall at the Virginia Ratifying Convention)).
195. See Gil Seinfeld, Waiver-in-Litigation:  Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the
Voluntariness Question, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 871, 884–90 (2002) (finding “voluntariness
principle” that runs through all waiver contexts); Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State
Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 Duke L.J. 1167,
1226–39 (2003) (considering types of waiver by litigation).
196. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002) (“[T]he Eleventh
Amendment waiver rules are different when a State’s federal-court participation is
involuntary.”).  In Lapides, the State’s state court participation was involuntary but its
federal court participation was voluntary.  The court held that the State’s removal to
federal court constituted waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.  A State appearing
in state court voluntarily but in federal court involuntarily might therefore still enjoy some
Eleventh Amendment protection.
197. When it waives by statute, for instance, a State can consent to suit in its own
courts without consenting to suit in federal courts.  See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441
(1900) (“[W]e think that it has not consented to be sued except in one of its own courts.”).
198. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, 375 F.3d 831, 848 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[A] state that voluntarily brings suit as a plaintiff in state court cannot invoke the
Eleventh Amendment when the defendant seeks removal to a federal court of competent
jurisdiction.”); Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., 359 F.3d
1237, 1239 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[The Eleventh Amendment] does not apply to suits
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context of diversity jurisdiction.199  These situations might well be distin-
guishable:  When a state sues on federal questions it is in some way con-
senting to federal jurisdiction even if it sues in state court, but when a
state sues on state law in state court it does not.200
Another motivation for sovereign immunity is the desire to avoid in-
terfering with the independent functioning of states.201  Here the danger
is that without sovereign immunity, “ ‘the course of [states’] public policy
and the administration of their public affairs’ may become ‘subject to and
controlled by the mandates of judicial tribunals without their con-
sent . . . .’”202  Allowing removal of parens patriae suits under CAFA hin-
ders state enforcement actions in a way that implicates this aspect of sov-
ereign immunity.  Historically, state enforcement actions were often seen
as “penal in nature” and so could not be brought in other courts, since a
state would thereby be using foreign courts to enforce its own laws.203
commenced or prosecuted by a State.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119
F.3d 1559, 1564–65 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment applies to suits
‘against’ a state, not suits by a state.”); see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101
(1972) (holding that state suits against non-states “may now be brought in or removed to
the Circuit Courts” (quoting Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 470 (1883))).  The Supreme
Court cases cited here, though frequently mentioned in this context, are not precisely on-
point, since they deal with the Court’s original jurisdiction and whether it is exclusive of
jurisdiction in the lower federal courts, not Eleventh Amendment immunity. Edmondson,
359 F.3d at 1239.
199. In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700, 711 (5th Cir. 2008).  The
precise question never addressed is “whether a state as a plaintiff suing defendants over
whom it has regulatory authority in state court under its own state laws may be removed to
federal court on diversity grounds under CAFA, rather than federal question jurisdiction.”
Id.
200. A debate currently rages in Eleventh Amendment theory between the “official”
reading, which the Court has adopted, and the far narrower “diversity” reading, which
holds that the Eleventh Amendment applies only in diversity cases and not in federal
question cases.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale
L.J. 1425 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment:  A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:  A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1889 (1983).  While the diversity reading is pitched at a higher level of generality than
the narrow issue considered here, it does lend credence to the idea that sovereign
immunity might offer greater protection where jurisdiction is based on diversity rather
than a federal question.
201. Milstead, supra note 187, at 539. R
202. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505
(1887)).
203. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 62, at 426–28 (“[A] Circuit Court of the R
United States cannot entertain jurisdiction of a suit in behalf of the State, or of the people
thereof, to recover a penalty imposed by way of punishment for a violation of a statute of
the State, ‘the courts of the United States . . . having no power to execute the penal laws of
the individual States.’” (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672–73 (1892))).  The
analogy was drawn to the longstanding idea that state criminal prosecutions of noncitizens
do not fall within the party-based grant of federal jurisdiction under Article III.  See id. at
402 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
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While this is no longer the case,204 allowing removal of most or all parens
patriae actions might still be troubling, since it would make states “depen-
dent on federal instrumentalities for the enforcement of their own
laws.”205  This would put federal courts in a position to interfere with the
independent policy and statutory choices of states in a way that implicates
the Eleventh Amendment.
However, one important concern—the desire to protect state coffers
by insulating them from litigation—functions as a counterargument to
the idea that the Eleventh Amendment applies here.206  Part of the rea-
son for the importance of sovereign immunity in early America was the
crushing debt in which many states found themselves after the
Revolutionary War—debt that could have led to insolvency if states had
been subject to suit.207  Even if a state is not on the brink of bankruptcy,
giving courts access to state funds places them, at least theoretically, in a
position of power over states, a situation that is seen as a violation of the
political process.208  This concern does not apply in the state as plaintiff
context; the most a state stands to lose is the cost of representation, which
it has voluntarily set aside anyway.209  To some extent this factor might
undermine the general argument, but it is not always dispositive on its
own.210
Overall, it is difficult to argue that removal of parens patriae suits
filed by states in state court is clearly unconstitutional under the Eleventh
Amendment or the principles it embodies.  The law in the circuits is, af-
ter all, quite clear that a state voluntarily appearing as plaintiff in state
court enjoys no immunity from removal.211  The situation here is differ-
ent in two respects that might alter this analysis enough to sway the out-
come.  First, removal is based on diversity jurisdiction, which might imply
that the state has not consented to appear in federal court the way it does
204. See id at 488–502 (describing expansion of State standing in federal courts).
205. Id. at 437.  This is seen as impermissible for the same reasons that federal
prosecutions are not permitted in state courts:  Doing so would turn the states into
“bureaucratic arms of a central administration.”  Id.  Woolhandler and Collins also note
that “routine removal of state prosecutions to federal court could make federal judicial
approval a requirement for state prosecution.”  Id. at 437 n.196.
206. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 750 (“Private suits against nonconsenting States—
especially suits for money damages—may threaten the financial integrity of the States.”).
207. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418 (1979).
208. Alden, 527 U.S. at 750.
209. A weak response might be that litigating in federal court is more expensive, so a
State that is subject to removal is involuntarily exposed to higher costs.  See Milstead, supra
note 187, at 538 & n.233 ([T]he cost of litigating in federal court is higher than in state R
court . . . .”).  On the other hand, a State can simply drop the case if it is daunted by the
costs associated with federal court.  Furthermore, “[w]hile . . . the cost of litigating in
federal court is higher than in state court, this does not necessarily mean that litigating in
federal court is more expensive to the litigants.”  Id.
210. For instance, in Ex parte Young, the court allowed a “suit for injunction against
state officials but not against [the] state itself.”  Id. at 538 n.236 (citing Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908)).
211. See supra note 198. R
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when it sues on federal questions.  Second, removal of virtually all parens
patriae suits threatens to make states dependent on federal courts for the
enforcement of state laws.  At the very least, these issues cast doubt on the
ability of the Allstate doctrine to function smoothly in the federal system.
III. PARENS PATRIAE SUITS SHOULD NOT BE REMOVABLE UNDER CAFA
Looking to the real parties in interest is an inadequate solution for
determining whether a parens patriae suit is removable under CAFA.
Faced with representative actions by states, courts must strike a balance
between two poles:  (1) allowing the presence of a state to automatically
destroy jurisdiction, which would allow jurisdictional gamesmanship,212
and (2) allowing removal of virtually all parens patriae suits, which under-
cuts CAFA’s goals and creates federalism problems.213  This Part argues
that the solution that best strikes this balance is to treat legitimate parens
patriae suits as not removable.  Instead of looking to the real parties in
interest, courts should scrutinize the asserted quasi-sovereign interest to
determine whether the state’s parens patriae standing is legitimate.  If it
is, the case should not be removable under CAFA.  Part III.A argues that
examining the quasi-sovereign interest adequately prevents the jurisdic-
tional gamesmanship CAFA sought to quash.  Part III.B suggests that this
approach would also solve the federalism problems associated with
Allstate.  Finally, Part III.C finds support for this solution within the text of
CAFA itself.
A. A Close Scrutiny of the State’s Asserted Quasi-Sovereign Interest Adequately
Prevents Jurisdictional Gamesmanship
Faced with an apparently legitimate parens patriae suit, the Allstate
court held that it must examine the real parties in interest as a possible
basis for removal.214  This conclusion was based on Congress’s rejection
of an amendment that would have exempted all suits brought by attor-
neys general as well as suggestions, in the accompanying debates, that
such a provision would create a loophole that could be exploited by
plaintiffs’ lawyers.215  As a solution to this problem, though, the real party
in interest inquiry is overinclusive, theoretically allowing removal of virtu-
ally all parens patriae suits and not just class actions in disguise.216
Senators Grassley and Hatch, whose comments formed the basis for this
solution, insisted repeatedly that this result was not one CAFA was meant
212. See supra note 103 (discussing rejection of amendment that would have R
exempted all suits brought by States).
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. See Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 429 (5th Cir.
2008) (“Even assuming arguendo that the Attorney General has standing to bring such a
representative action, the narrow issue before this court is who are the real parties in
interest:  the individual policyholders or the State.”).
215. Id. at 424; see also supra note 116. R
216. See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text. R
\\server05\productn\C\COL\111-1\COL103.txt unknown Seq: 30 30-NOV-10 11:03
150 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 111:121
to achieve.217  Instead they maintained that parens patriae suits would be
left undisturbed by CAFA.218
Looking at the legitimacy of the quasi-sovereign interest that forms
the basis of a parens patriae suit does an adequate job of preventing juris-
dictional gamesmanship.  A state cannot simply pursue the interests of
private parties as a basis for parens patriae standing.219  Parens patriae
standing must instead be based on the health and well-being of a state’s
citizens in general.220  There are meaningful limits on a state’s ability to
sue as parens patriae, and there is little reason to think that plaintiffs’
lawyers would be able to exploit parens patriae standing to avoid removal
of class actions.  To bring a parens patriae suit, a plaintiffs’ attorney
would have to secure the cooperation of the attorney general.221  This
alone is admittedly not an insurmountable obstacle.222  In order to ex-
pand the litigation beyond one state, the attorney would have to work
with numerous attorneys general and file suit in each individual state,
since a state cannot file a parens patriae suit in the courts of another
state.  Exempting parens patriae suits would therefore not provide an
easy loophole by which attorneys could keep class actions that are na-
tional in scope—the focus of CAFA—in state court.223  The cases that
would still be subject to removal under this doctrine would be precisely
those mentioned in congressional debates:  class actions in which states
are part of the plaintiff class.224
217. See supra note 103 (quoting statements to this effect). R
218. Senator Grassley said that “cases brought by State attorneys general will not be
affected by this bill,” and Senator Hatch observed that the bill “applies only to class actions,
and not parens patriae actions.”  151 Cong. Rec. S1163–64 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005)
(statements of Sens. Grassley and Hatch).
219. See supra notes 88–89. R
220. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982); see supra note 89 (discussing tension between states’ ability to protect general well- R
being of citizens and inability to sue on behalf of certain citizens).
221. “No one can add a State attorney general [to a lawsuit] without his or her express
consent or permission.”  151 Cong. Rec. S1159 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Pryor).
222. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, after all, often work with attorneys general.  See supra note
95.  On the other hand, the political accountability of attorneys general might help R
prevent improper collusion with plaintiffs’ attorneys.  See 151 Cong. Rec. S1159 (daily ed.
Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Pryor) (vigorously disputing idea that attorneys general
might “allow their friends to use their names to avoid moving the case to Federal court”).
223. Of course, parens patriae suits in the aggregate can be national in scope.  The
tobacco litigation, which had sweeping national ramifications, ended when forty-six parens
patriae suits joined in one master settlement.  See supra note 45.  What is more difficult to R
imagine is the highjacking of this doctrine by plaintiffs’ attorneys as a way of bringing
nationwide class actions in state court.  Still, it is not completely inconceivable that this
might occur.
224. “The way this [amendment] is drafted would allow plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring
class actions and simply include in their complaint a State attorney general’s name as a
purported class member, arguably to make their class action completely immune to the
provisions of this bill.”  151 Cong. Rec. S1163 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
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One counterargument that could be leveled against this solution is
that it is too deferential to state parens patriae doctrine.  The doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court delimits a state’s ability to sue in federal
court, but not its ability to sue in state court; individual states do that,
either by statute or by common law.225  Under this solution, a state could
expand its attorney general’s parens patriae authority in order to help
avoid CAFA’s removal provisions.  But CAFA contains a subsection ex-
empting suits brought “pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing
such action,”226 and Congress also insisted that CAFA should not be inter-
preted as setting aside Erie:  Federal courts are still to apply state law.227
These considerations, taken together, indicate a deferential stance to-
ward state law on such matters, one that belies a sweeping distrust of all
state policy decisions.
B. This Approach Mitigates Federalism Problems Associated with Widespread
Removal
Removal of nearly all parens patriae suits raises Eleventh
Amendment concerns that are substantially alleviated by a more deferen-
tial approach.  Broad removal threatens to interfere with state enforce-
ment of state law, hindering the independent functioning of states in a
way that might run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.228  This problem is
avoided if legitimate enforcement actions are left undisturbed and only
suits that are not based on quasi-sovereign interests are removed.  Simi-
larly, a state’s dignity interest in not being haled unwillingly into federal
court229 seems to be less of a concern if the state is merely engaging in
jurisdictional gamesmanship.
C. The Text of CAFA Lends Support to this Solution
There is also strong textual support for this solution in CAFA itself.
The holding of Katrina Canal, that class actions may be removable despite
the presence of a state as a plaintiff, is unavoidable by the plain meaning
of CAFA, since nothing in the statute exempts a class action on that basis.
One provision of the bill, however, does exempt representative suits “as-
serted on behalf of the general public.”230  Although some commentators
assumed that this subsection was meant to exempt parens patriae suits,231
225. See id. at S1159 (statement of Sen. Pryor) (noting dramatic variations in state
parens patriae authority).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III) (2006).  This provision also requires that the
suit be “asserted on behalf of the general public,” which might put the classic quasi-
sovereign interest outside its scope.  Id.
227. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 49, 61, 66 (2005) (“[C]lass action decisions rendered
in federal court should be the same as if they were decided in state court—under the Erie
doctrine, federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases.”).
228. See supra notes 201–205 and accompanying text. R
229. See supra notes 188–200 and accompanying text. R
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).
231. See supra notes 98–99. R
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no court has ever accepted this reading.232  So while this provision may
not compel the exemption of parens patriae suits,233 it does provide sup-
port for the idea that parens patriae actions are in some sense outside the
scope of CAFA.
Stronger textual support for the exemption of parens patriae suits
comes from the absence of any provision making them subject to CAFA.
CAFA applies to class actions, which are defined as those brought pursu-
ant to Rule 23 (or state equivalent),234 and mass actions, which are de-
fined as claims of more than 100 people tried jointly due to “common
questions of law or fact.”235  A parens patriae action does not fit easily
within either definition.  In order to treat the parens patriae suit in
Allstate as a “mass action,” the Fifth Circuit had to treat an action involv-
ing one plaintiff (the State of Louisiana) as involving, by virtue of un-
named real parties in interest, the “monetary claims of 100 or more per-
sons.”236  Nowhere does CAFA instruct courts to perform this inquiry.237
By its plain meaning, CAFA therefore does not apply to parens patriae
suits, which have only one plaintiff.
This solution is close to the approach used in Illinois v. SDS West
Corp.238  In SDS, the court began by examining and approving the State’s
asserted quasi-sovereign interest.239  Responding to the defendant’s argu-
ment, the court admitted that there were other real parties in interest but
held that their presence did not diminish the interest of the state, since
“[t]he fact that private parties may benefit monetarily from a favorable
resolution of this case does not minimize nor negate [the state’s] substan-
tial interest.”240  The SDS approach therefore retains the real party in
interest inquiry, but with a different result.  But as the court in SDS noted,
this inquiry is unnecessary if the state’s quasi-sovereign interest has al-
ready been approved.241  After all, a state that is bringing a legitimate
232. See supra notes 100–101.  On the other hand, no court has explicitly rejected R
this reading either, and this provision has gone unmentioned in every case that has
examined this issue.
233. Certain turns of phrase may, depending on one’s reading, render the subsection
inapplicable to many parens patriae suits.  See supra note 101. R
234. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B).
235. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
236. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 430 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“Having determined that the policyholders are real parties in interest, we agree that this
action was properly removed pursuant to CAFA because the requirements of a ‘mass
action’ are easily met . . . .”).
237. In establishing the boundaries of its jurisdictional grant, CAFA uses terms like
“claims,” “plaintiffs,” and “members” of “plaintiff classes.”  See generally Pub. L. No. 109-2,
119 Stat. 4 (2005).  Nowhere does CAFA mention “real parties in interest.”  Id.
238. 640 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (C.D. Ill. 2009); see supra Part II.A.3.
239. SDS, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1050–51.
240. Id. at 1053 (alteration in original) (quoting Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. Microsoft
Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 537, 546 (S.D. Miss. 2006)).
241. See id. at 1052 (noting that although bulk of relief might inure to consumers
rather than State, “because of quasi-sovereign interests, that is the same thing”).
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parens patriae action is almost by definition a real party in interest.242  It
is therefore simpler, and functionally equivalent, to jettison the real party
in interest inquiry completely and focus instead on the legitimacy of the
state’s quasi-sovereign interest.
Of course, courts are often required to look beyond complaints to
prevent fraudulent pleadings.243  This Note does not argue that courts be
bound by whatever “labels . . . the parties may attach.”244  Courts would
still scrutinize the basis for parens patriae standing by looking for a legiti-
mate quasi-sovereign interest or authorizing statute.  If a case is brought
pursuant to legitimate parens patriae authority, though, it would not be
removable based on the presence of others who might have been, but are
not, parties to the litigation.
CONCLUSION
The application of CAFA’s removal provisions to parens patriae ac-
tions is deeply problematic, embodying an expansion of CAFA that is jus-
tified by neither its text nor its legislative history.  It is true that CAFA
sought to stamp out jurisdictional gamesmanship by plaintiffs’ attorneys,
but looking to the purported real parties in interest who are not before
the court is a troubling solution to this problem.  Parens patriae actions
are not a likely refuge for class action lawyers seeking shelter from
CAFA’s removal provisions.  Even if some gamesmanship takes this form,
the real party in interest inquiry is a vastly overinclusive solution to a mi-
nor problem, potentially allowing removal of virtually all parens patriae
suits, regardless of their legitimacy.  In order to avoid these problems,
and in order to ensure that they do not run afoul of the principles of
federalism embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, courts should instead
scrutinize the quasi-sovereign interest that forms the basis for parens pa-
triae standing.  By doing so, courts would achieve CAFA’s goals without
finding themselves the arbiters of countless state enforcement actions
brought to vindicate the interests of state citizens for violations of state
law.
242. In defining the scope of parens patriae standing, the Supreme Court excluded
actions brought by States for the sake of other real parties in interest, implying that a State
would not have parens patriae standing if it were not itself a real party in interest.  See
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982) (“A State
may . . . pursue those interests only for the sake of the real party in interest. . . . In such
situations, the State is no more than a nominal party.”).
243. See supra text accompanying note 117. R
244. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 424 (5th Cir. 2008).
